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glaring defect in the court's analysis is that it treats the state finding
as one of a singular factual issue, rather than as an issue of fact so en-
tangled with an overlay of legal issues that it is impossible to extract
with confidence the one factual finding relevant to the second suit.
The state court issue was decided as one of mixed fact and law; the
federal court issue wai one of fact alone. Therefore the issues were
not the same in both suits. The issues being different, no estoppel
should have attached.7'
FRANK LANE WILLIAMSON
Civil Procedure-Kidd v. Early: Summary Judgment on Testi-
monial Evidence in North Carolina
In Cutts v. Casey' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that any
testimonial evidence submitted in support of a motion for a directed
verdict created an issue of credibility to be presented to the jury. This.
holding gave rise to dire predictions 2 that the North Carolina summary
judgment procedure would be crippled. The North Carolina Supreme
Court, however, has narrowed the scope of Cutts by setting guidelines
for determining when an issue of credibility actually arises.
In Kidd v. Early' the court granted summary judgment4 for the
evidence to show whaj was decided in the first suit. The holding in the instant case
thus could possibly have been redeemed if the court had examined the trial record
and, say, found the level of evidence against a threat having been made so overwhelm-
ing as to support a partial directed verdict in an antitrust trial. With such a demonstra-
tion, the ambiguity of the judge's findings could justifiably have been disregarded.
71. The instant case should at least remind us that the "lesson" preached by
Professor Vestal has not been thoroughly learned: "One of the lessons which must
be learned is that great exactness must be used in determining the issues decided in
Suit I and to be decided -in Suit .. . . In the years ahead, it will be necessary
to use more finesse in the area." Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Nature
of the Controversy, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 158, 192 (1965). The basic value of Azalea
is to point out that refinement of collateral estoppel technique is needed to insure
that the "fit" between issues is a close one.
1. 278 N.C. 390, 180 S.E.2d 297 (1971).
2. Louis, A Survey of Decisions Under the New North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure, 50 N.C.L. REv. 729 (1972); Note, Civil Procedure-Cutts v. Casey Extended
to Summary Judgment, 54 N.C.L. Rv. 940 (1976).
3. 289 N.C. 343, 222 S.E.2d 392 (1976).
4. Pursuant to N.C.R. Crv. P. 56. The North Carolina Rules of Civil Proce-
dure were enacted in 1970. Rule 56 enables a court to grant final judgment for a
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party bearing the burden of proof at trial who supported his motion
with depositions and affidavits, while the non-moving party failed to
produce any evidence to support his opposition to the motion. For the
first time in North Carolinh, the court held that testimonial evidence
does not automatically trigger an issue of credibility which must go to
the jury, but may be afforded credibility as a matter of law if it is dis-
interested, unimpeached and uncontradicted.
The parties stipulated that on August 4, 1972, plaintiffs, Dr. Claude
Kidd, Thomas H. Collins and David P. Dillard,5 purchased a thirty-day
renewable option to purchase farm land in Guilford County, North Caro-
lina from defendant, C.F. Early. The option agreement failed to spec-
ify any time or method of payment.
On September 28, 1972, plaintiffs executed a written offer to pur-
chase and delivered it to defendant, who refused to accept their terms
for payment." The next day plantiffs mailed a letter to defendant exer-
cising the option,7 and delivered a check for $119,000 to their attorney
to hold until the deed was delivered.8  Defendant found these terms
unacceptable and refused to convey the property.
After further negotiations, the parties continued to disagree on the
method of payment and the purchasers filed suit seeking specific per-
formance of the option contract. After the pleadings were filed, both
parties moved for summary judgment under rule 56. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the vendor, and the purchasers ap-
party before trial when there remains no genuine issue of material fact. The court
applies the law to the undisputed facts and grants summary judgment for the party
entitled to it as a matter of law.
5. Plaintiff Kidd originally purchased the option with Howard M. Coble, who
later sold his interest to Kidd. Later, Kidd assigned one-third of his interest to Col-
lins and one-third of his interest to Dillard. 289 N.C. at 347, 222 S.E.2d at 396.
6. Defendant Early learned* from talking with his CPA that he would gain a
substantial tax advantage if he were paid in installments rather than in cash on delivery
of the deed. Id. at 348-49, 222 S.E.2d at 397.
7. The letter read in part:
The option granted by you on September 1, 1972, for the purchase of
200 acres more or less of the C. F. Early farm . . . is hereby exercised by
delivery of a check to your joint order in the sum of $119,000 to my at-
torneys . . . to be held in trust for you and given over to you upon the
occurrence of the following conditions:
(1) The furnishing of a new survey by you of the land being sold as
provided in the option agreement;
(2) Delivery by you of a good and marketable warranty deed in fee
simple absolute, free of all encumbrances, to the property covered by the
option agreement.
Id. at 349-50, 222 S.E.2d at 397-98.
8. At the time the check was delivered, the balance in the account from which
the check was drawn was only $17,173. Id. at 350, 222 S.E.2d at 398.
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pealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed by finding
that there was a genuine issue of material fact that required a jury trial.
The court affirmed the denial of summary judgment for the purchasers
and remanded the case for jury trial.9
On appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court determined that the
undisputed facts established every essential element except the pur-
chasers' willingness and ability to perform the contract at the time they
.exercised the option."0 To meet their burden of proof on this remain-
Ing issue, the purchasers submitted their own affidavits, loan applica-
tions and financial statements" showing that their net worth was be-
tween $261,000 and $364,494 at the time the option was exercised.
They also submitted the affidavit of the president of the Federal Land
Bank Association of Winston-Salem that stated that he was prepared
to issue a firm commitment loan of $100,000 to the purchasers using
the farmland as security. The vendor made no response to these mat-
erials.,
Since the vendor failed to present any evidence in opposition
to the purchaser's evidence in support of the motion, the court de-
termined that rule 56(e) would allow summary judgment if the pur-
chasers met their burden of production and succeeded on their own
evidence.' 2 The court held that any credibility problems were minimal
and that only latent doubts existed about the accuracy of the pur-
9. Kidd v. Early, 23 N.C. App. 129, 135, 208 S.E.2d 511, 516 (1974).
10. Defendant asserted three defenses to the motion for summary judgment, based
upon the uncontested facts of the case: (1) the description of the property was in-
sufficient to meet the Statute of Frauds; (2) the option was void because the parties
had failed to agree upon an essential term-the method of payment; and (3) plaintiffs
failed to tender payment within the option period. The North Carolina Supreme Court
rejected all three affirmative defenses and denied defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment since he was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law under N.C.R. Civ.
P. 56(c). 289 N.C. at 364-65, 222 S.E.2d at 407.
11. N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(e) states that:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided in this rule, the opposing party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
The court may also consider oral testimony at a summary judgment proceeding
under N.C.R. Civ. P. 43 (e).
12. 289 N.C. at 365-66, 222 S.E.2d at 407.
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chasers' proof. As a result, the purchasers were held to have met
their burden of production on the remaining factual issue and were
granted summary judgment. 13
Summary judgment 14 is a means of looking beyond the pleadings
to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. 15 Both
parties may move for summary judgment 16 regardless of which party
carries the burden of proof at trial,17 but the burden is upon the moving
party to establish the lack of any triable issue of fact.' 8 The evidence
presented to meet this burden may not be sufficient even if the op-
posing party fails to present any materials in opposition to the motion;'9
any doubt about the existence of a material issue of fact is resolved
against the moving party.20 Once the moving party meets the initial
13. Id. at 372, 222 S.E.2d at 411. Quoting from Professor Louis' article, the
court stated that the standard for determining the sufficiency of the moving party's
evidence is as follows:
(1) Mhe [movant's] supporting evidence is self-contradictory or circumstan-
tially suspicious or the credibility of a witness is inherently suspect either
because he is interested in th& outcome of the case and the facts are pecu-
liarly within his own knowledge or because he has testified as to matters of
opinion involving a substantial margin for. honest error, (2) there are sig-
nificant gaps in the movant's evidence or it is circumstantial and reasonably
allows inferences inconsistent with the existence of an essential element, or
(3) although all the evidentiary or historical facts are established, reasonable
minds may still differ over their application to some principle such as the
prudent man standard for negligence cases.
289 N.C. at 366-67, 222 S.E.2d at 408 (quoting Louis, supra note 2, at 738-39).
Only one standard was not met: the affidavits were presented by interested parties
and the facts were peculiarly within their own knowledge.
14. See note 4 supra.
15. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 282
N.C. 44, 191 S.E.2d 683 (1972).
16. See, e.g., McNair v. Boyette, 282 N.C. 230, 192 S.E.2d 457 (1972). N.C.R.
Cxv. P. 56(a) & (b) state that either the "claimant" or the "defending party" may
move for summary judgment.
17. See, e.g., First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 282
N.C. 44, 191 S.E.2d 683 (1972). There is a greater reluctance, however, to grant
summary judgment for the party bearing the burden of proof at trial. See Louis, Fed-
eral Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE LJ. 745, 748, 755
n.42 (1974).
18. See, e.g., Whitley v. Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204, 210 S.E.2d 289 (1974);
Pridgen v. Hughes, 9 N.C. App. 635, 1.77 S.E.2d 425 (1970).
19. See, e.g., Lineberger v. Colonial Life & Accid. Ins. Co., 12 N.C. App." 135,
182 S.E.2d 643 (1971); Robinson v. McMahon, 11 N.C. App. 275, 181 S.E.2d 147
(1971). See also N.C.R. C-v. P. 56(e), set forth in note 11 supra. The North Caro-
lina courts have interpreted the meaning of the rule to be that even if the non-moving
party fails to present any evidence, the moving party's materials may not be enough
to entitle the moving party to summary judgment.
20. Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, P.A., 286 N.C. 24, 29, 209 S.E.2d 795, 798
(1974); see Millsaps v. Wilkes Contracting Co., 14 N.C. App. 321, 188 S.E.2d 663
(1972). "ITihe Court in considering the motion carefully scrutinizes the papers of
the moving party and, on the whole, regards those of the opposing party with in-
dulgence." 289 N.C. at 29, 209 S.E.2d at 798.
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burden by showing a lack of any triable issue of fact,21 the opposing
party must come forward with some evidence tending to show a triable
issue of fact or explain his failure to do so under rule 56(f).22
The North Carolina courts view the summary judgment procedure
as a drastic remedy to be granted with caution.23 The procedure does
not entitle the court to decide an issue of fact, but merely to determine
whether an issue of fact exists. 24  The procedure is not designed to
constitute a trial by affidavits in which the court weighs the sufficiency
of evidence or weighs the credibility of testimony, 25 since these are tra-
ditionally the province of the jury.
Although the North Carolina courts agree that all issues of credi-
bility must be presented to the jury, the courts have not applied a uni-
form evidentiary standard for determining when an issle of credibility
arises. In Cutts26 the North Carolina Supreme Court indicated that all
21. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(e), set forth in note 11 supra.
22. N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(f) states in full:
When Affidavits are Unavailable.-Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make
such other order as is just.
The courts have excused the failure to present materials when the evidence was
within the moving party's own knowledge and not available to the non-moving party.
Lee v. Shor, 10 N.C. App. 231, 178 S.E.2d 101 (1970).
23. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 282 N.C.
44, 52, 191 S.E.2d 683, 688 (1972); W. SHuFORD, NORTH CAROLINA PRAcMcn AND
PRocEDURE § 56-3, at 467-68 (1975). Shuford also suggests that numerous North
Carolina practitioners are taking advantage of the new rule, and that more summary
judgment motions have been appealed than any other procedure made available by
the new North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
24. Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C. 375, 218 S.E.2d 379 (1975); Zimmerman v.
Hogg & Allen, P.A., 286 N.C. 24, 209 S.E.2d 795 (1974); Houck v. Overcash, 282
N.C. 623, 193 S.E.2d 905 (1973). The courts should not decide which affidavits
are true when there is a conflict in the evidence presented.
25. Lee v. Shor, 10 N.C. App. 231, 235, 178 S.E.2d 101, 104 (1970); see Mitchell
v. Mitchell, 12 N.C. App. 54, 182 S.E.2d 627 (1971).
26. 278 N.C. 390, 180 S.E.2d 297 (1971). Although Cutts v. Casey is a directed
verdict case, the standards for directing a verdict and granting summary judgment are
essentially the same. See Millsaps v. Wilkes Contracting Co., 14 N.C. App. 321,
188 S.E.2d 663, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 623, 190 S.E.2d 466 (1972); Coakley v. Ford
Motor Co., 11 N.C. App. 636, 182 S.E.2d 260, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 393, 183 S.E.2d
244 (1971). In Cutts v. Casey both parties claimed title to the same piece of property.
Each party presented a survey showing that he owned the land in question, relying
partly upon testimonial evidence to establish his claim. The North Carolina Supreme
Court stated: "The established policy of this State-declared in both the constitution
and the statutes-is that the credibility of testimony is for the jury, not the court,
and that a genuine issue of fact must be tried by the jury unless this right is waived."
278 N.C. at 421, 10 S.E.2d at 314.
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testimonial evidence creates a credibility issue that must be resolved
by a jury. In reinstating a jury verdict after the trial judge granted
a judgment n.o.v., the court stated that testimonial evidence could
never support a directed verdict:2" to do so would violate the opposing
party's right to jury trial, which is guaranteed by the North Carolina
Constitution.28 The Cutts rationale is based on the premise that "the
right to determine the credibility of witnesses lies at the core of the
jury's factfinding function." 9  Since affidavits are not subject to cross-
examination, and since no one can observe the behavior of the affiant
making his statement, affidavits are generally considered to be "the
least satisfactory form of evidentiary materials."30 Depositions are also
regarded with skepticism, even though the witness was cross-examined,
since the court is unable to observe the demeanor of the witness. 3
The observation of the demeanor of a witness is necessary, because the
witness can be either lying intentionally or mistaken about the facts.3 2
The Cutts rationale was applied to a motion for summary judgment
in Shearin v. National Indemnity Co.33 The North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that an uncontradicted eyewitness' statement raised an
issue of credibility, which the jury must resolve. The court, however,
27. 278 N.C. at 421, 180 S.E.2d at 314.
28. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 25 was relied upon by the court in its opinion. It
reads: "In all controversies at law respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by
jury is one of the best securities of the rights of the people, and shall remain sacred
and inviolable."
29. Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55
MiNN. L. Rav. 903, 928 (1971).
30. 6 (pt. 2) MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.15[4], at 514 (2d ed. 1975).
31. See Cooper, supra note 29, at 929.40.
32. Id. The validity of these checks on credibility does not go unquestioned.
To reach conclusions solely on the basis of demeanor is a very weak foundation for
a judgment, especially since it may be that juries form less accurate decisions when
they base them on the observation of witnesses. The demeanor of a witness can
be misleading because many factors combine to make the witness behave the way
he does on a witness stand. For example, the witness may appear nervous either
because he is lying or because he feels uncomfortable speaking in front of a large
group of people; or his nervousness may be merely a mannerism. The jury is just
as likely to distort the truth since they too are witnesses. Since the jury must rely
upon demeanor evidence alone if the testimony goes uncontradicted and unimpeached
by the non-moving party, the accuracy of the appraisal is highly suspect. And if
the non-moving party fails to present opposing evidence at the summary judgment
level, it is unlikely that he will obtain the necessary evidence by the time the trial
begins. Therefore if the court determines that the evidence is so strong that the jury
cannot disbelieve the testimony merely on the basis of demeanor, then the court should
be able to assign credibility as a matter of law and avoid a long unnecessary trial.
33. 27 N.C. App. 88, 218 S.E.2d 207 (1975); accord, Lowe's of Greensboro,
Inc. v. Curry, 29 N.C. App. 229, 223 S.E.2d 909 (1976); Van Poole v. Messer, 19
N.C. App. 70, 198 S.E.2d 106 (1973); Wyche v. Alexander, 15 N.C. App. 130, 189
S.E.2d 608, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 764, 191 S.E.2d 361 (1972).
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stated that but for the Cutts opinion, summary judgment would have
been appropriate.14
Other cases deny summary judgment for the moving party when
the testimonial evidence is presented by an interested party and the
facts were within his own knowledge. In three cases, the witness was
held to be interested because of an economic relationship with the mov-
ing party. In Lee v. Shor3" and Shook Builders Supply Co. v. Eastern
Associates, Inc.36 the affiants were either the directors or the president
of the company that was moving for summary judgment. As a result
of this relationship, the parties were interested, and "[The affiant's]
credibility itself may be such an issue of fact as will take the case to
trial. T37 In Norfolk & Western Railway v. Werner Industries Inc.38 the
sole eyewitness to the accident over which the dispute arose was an
employee of the moving party. The court denied summary judgment
on this basis, and on the basis that conflicting inferences arose from
the evidence presented.
Other cases, however, have completely ignored the Cutts require-
ment that all testimonial evidence be presented to the jury. In Brooks
v. Smith39 and Bogle v. Duke Power Co.40 defendants used testimonial
evidence to meet the burden of production to establish their affirmative
defenses of contributory negligence on motions for summary judgment.
In both cases the evidence was deemed sufficient since the affiants
were disinterested and plaintiff failed to contradict or impeach the tes-
timony.
The court in Kidd rejected the Cutts rule that all testimonial evi-
dence must be.presented to the jury even though it may be extremely
credible. In explaining the different results reached under Kidd and
Cutts the court stressed the factual differences between the two cases,
rather than basing the distinction upon the differences between a di-.
rected verdict and a motion for summary judgment. 41 In Cutts the
34. 27 N.C. App. at 91-92, 218 S.E.2d at 210. The court, in deciding whether
summary judgment would be appropriate for the party bearing the burden of proof
at trial who used testimonial evidence to meet his burden of production, stated that
"on authority of Cutts v. Casey, ... we conclude the answer is No." 27 N.C. App.
at 91, 218 S.E.2d at 210.
35. 10 N.C. App. 231, 178 S.E.2d 101 (1970).
36. 24 N.C. App. 533, 211 S.E.2d 472 (1975).
37. Id. at 537, 211 S.E.2d at 475.
38. 286 N.C. 89, 209 S.E.2d 734 (1974).
39. 27 N.C. App. 223, 218 S.E.2d 489 (1975).
40. 27 N.C. App. 318, 219 S.E.2d 308, cert. denied, 289 N.C. 296, 222 S.E.2d
695 (1976).
41. 289 N.C. at 370, 222 S.E.2d at 410. For a discussion of the differences
[Vol. 55238
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court noted that the facts presented by testimonial evidence were vigor-
ously attacked by the opposing party. The credibility issue arose not
because the evidence was testimonial, but because the testimonial evi-
dence was challenged. In making the distinction, the court indicated
that Cutts was never meant to stand for the proposition that all testi-
monial evidence must go to the jury. Instead, Cutts is to be read as
saying that if testimonial evidence is contradicted, then a credibility is-
sue arises for the jury to consider.42
Therefore, Kidd and Cutts fall squarely within the federal inter-
pretation of rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4" The
federal courts may assign credibility as a matter of law when the evi-
dence is not contradicted or impeached.4" Even if the witness is inter-
ested in the outcome of the case, if the facts necessary to oppose the
between directed verdict and summary judgment, see Note, Civil Procedure-Cutts -v.
Casey Extended to Summary Judgment, 54 N.C.L. Rav. 940, 948 n.45 (1976).
42. Cutts v. Casey, 278 N.C. at 423, 180 S.E.2d at 319 (Huskins, J., concurring
in result); see'Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320 (1902);
2 A. MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1488.20 (Phillips Supp.
1970); 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILmE, FEDERAL. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2714 (1973);
Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HAnv. L. REV. 669, 690-
91 (1918).
It is clear that the summary judgment procedure itself does not deprive a party
of his constitutional right to jury trial, but it is arguable that testimonial evidence
does always create an issue of fact for the jury since it is always possible for the
witness to lie. Some federal courts applied this evidentiary standard. See Colby v.
Klune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
However, this test has not been followed even within the Second Circuit. See Dyer
v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952); 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2726, at 523 (1973). Prior to Kidd, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals considered itself to be bound to that standard as a result of Cutts.
See Note, Civil Procedure--Cutts v. Casey Extended to Summary Judgment, 54 N.C.L.
REV. 940, 942 (1976). But see cases cited notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text
supra. According to Robert Doge, one of the original members of the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
In reality, the rule does not interfere in the slightest degree with the right to
trial by jury, because the court can not, of course, enter a summary judgment
if there is any issue of fact to be tried, and if the court erroneously orders a
summary judgment, the right of appeal will protect the party.
The judge is not to weigh affidavits, is not to determine which affidavit is
right and which is wrong. He is simply to see whether upon the affidavits
there is a real issue of facts between the parties.
ABA PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTrrTrrE (ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE)
AT WASHINGTON, D.C., October 6-8, at 176 (1938).
43. For an analysis of the federal rule see Louis, Federal Summary Judgment
Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J 745 (1971).
44. The fact that a witness is interested in the outcome of the case is sufficient
to create a credibility problem for the jury to resolve. Sonnentheil v. Christian Moer-
lein Brewing, Inc., 172 U.S. 401 (1899). Some federal courts, however, limit this
rule to cases in which the facts are peculiarly within the moving party's own knowledge,
see Poller v. CBS, 368 U.S. 464 (1962), or when conflicting inferences arise from
the evidence presented, United States v. Perry, 431 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1970).
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motion are readily available to the non-moving party through discovery,
then credibility should be assigned as a matter of law if the non-moving
party presents no opposing evidence. It is assumed that the opponent
obtained, or could have obtained, the information necessary to contra-
dict the witness. If he failed to utilize discovery, then he loses because
he was too lazy to establish his case; if he utilizes the discovery pro-
cedure and finds nothing to support his opposition to the claim, then
there is no reason to question the veracity of the moving party's witness.
It would be a waste of time to require a full jury trial when the op-
posing party cannot, or will not, present any evidence to raise doubts
about the credibility of the witness in the mere hope45 that someihing
will turn up at trial.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Kidd, however, went be-
yond the federal standard by determining whether a credibility issue
actually arose from the facts presented. The court held that the testi-
monial evidence was presented by an interested party.; the court found
some of the facts peculiarly within the knowledge of that party and thus
not discoverable by the vendor. Under a strict construction of the
"interested party" rule this evidence would have been enough to create
a credibility problem that would have required a determination by the
jury. The court rejected strict application of the rule, stating that
"it is quite clear that it would be futile to attempt to state a general
rule which would determine whether a 'genuine issue *of fact' exists in
a particular case ' 40 and granted summary judgment for plaintiff because
only latent doubts about the credibility of his evidence existed.
The result reached by the court on the facts of Kidd is both prac-
tically and logically correct. The bank president's affidavit did not
create a credibility problem because the bank president had no reason
to lie about his willingness to grant a loan. The circumstances were
not suspicious since the bank was using the land as security and would
only grant the loan if the title were good. Even if it could be argued
45. Riieri V. Scanlon, 254 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The federal courts
clearly reject the idea that the non-moving party can go to trial on the mere hope
that some evidence will turn up, or the jury will disbelieve the testimony presented.
Compare Poller v. CBS, 368 U.S. 464 (1962) (holding that since motive was a crucial
issue, there was more than a mere hope that additional evidence would result from
a full jury trial) with Lundeen v. Cordner, 354 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1966) (holding
that a non-moving party cannot force a trial on the vague supposition that by cross-
examining a disinterested party he might be able to produce additional evidence).
46. 289 N.C. at 368, 222 S.E.2d at 409; see 6 (pt. 1) MooRE's FEDMAL PRACTtcE
56.15[1.-O, at 401 (2d ed. 1975).
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that there was an economic relationship between the parties, it would
have been too attenuated to cast doubts upon the witness' veracity with-
out some specific facts to show a closer relationship.
Plaintiff's affidavits, however, were presented by an interested
party and so should be viewed with more skepticism. In this case, how-
ever, it would have been a simple matter for defendant to use the dis-
covery procedure to get a look at the bank books, check the credit rat-
ing of plaintiffs and appraise the value of plantiffs' personal property.
The court is willing, under these circumstances, to shift the burden
of producing evidence to the non-moving party in the interests, of ju-
dicial expediency. By enabling the moving party to meet his initial
burden of proof with testimonial evidence when the opposing party has
access to the evidence, the court can make certain that the opposing
party has some specific evidence to get to the jury. If he fails to pro-
vide these facts, then summary judgment should be granted for the.
moving party.
Some of the testimony presented by the moving parties was used
to establish a subjective fact-their willingness to pay the purchase
price. Since it is impossible to discover the innehnost thoughts and
feelings of an opposing party, the only way to attack his statement of
events is to impeach his credibility. Such a situation of impossibility
provides sufficient excuse under rule 56(f) for failing to present op-
posing materials. As a result, a jury question is normally created and
summary judgment becomes inappropriate. 0
Nevertheless, the court in Kidd was willing to grant summary
judgment for the purchasers, probably because in the entire four years
of the dispute, the purchasers never gave any indication that they did
not want to perform the contract. Indeed, it is undisputed that the pur-
chasers suggested several methods of payment in order to find some
terms that the vendor would accept, and on several occasions voiced
their desire to purchase the land. The purchasers also exercised the
option, which bound them to the contract if defendant sought to enforce
it. On the basis of these manifestations, the purchasers' testimony
achieved credibility in the absence of a showing by defendants of some
specific facts demonstrating the purchasers' intent to renege on the
agreement.
As a result of the Kidd opinion, North Carolina attorneys who are
facediwith a motion for summary judgment by the party who bears the
burden of proof at trial must make some effort to gather specific facts
to contradict or impeach the witness before the hearing on the motion.
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If the attorney cannot get the necessary information because of witness
hostility or because the moving party has sole control over the infor-
mation, then he must move for a protective order under rule 56(f).
Otherwise, he runs the risk that the testimonial evidence will be afforded
credibility as a matter of law and that summary judgment will be granted
for. the moving party.
In Kidd v. Early the North Carolina Supreme Court set out a flex-
ible standard for determining the sufficiency of testimonial evidence on
a motion for summary judgment. With the help of this standard, the
courts can now determine with greater accuracy whether testimonial
evidence has created an issue of fact that must be presented to the jury.
This promotes judicial expediency by weeding out cases that contain no
factual disputes at the summary judgment level, without jeopardizing
the parties' right to a jury trial.
REBECCA WEIANT
Consitutional Law-Property and Liberty Interests in Public
Employment
The proposition that a government cannot unreasonably restrict
the exercise of constitutional rights by its employees has become a basic
tenet of constitutional law.1 However, in the absence of a specific stat-
ute or regulation to the contrary, a government's authority to dismiss
its employees for purely arbitrary reasons, or for no reason at all, has
remained essentially unchallenged. 2 Except for situations in which the
government appears motivated by a desire to stifle constitutional privi-
leges, the maximum protection afforded a public employee against dis-
charge has been some form of hearing at which he can appeal the de-
cision. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court, in the companion
1. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of
Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
2. The United States Supreme Court noted in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886 (1961) that "(t]he Court has consistently recognized that . . . the interest
of a government employee in retaining his job can be summarily denied. It has become
a settled principle that government employment, in the absence of legislation, can be
revoked at the will of the appointing officer." Id. at 896.
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